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Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment Challenges 
the Common Law Action of Criminal 
Conversation: Kline u. Ansell 
At common law the cause of action for criminal conversa- 
tion' was maintainable solely by the husband.' The basis of the 
action was adultery," and a plaintiff-husband could recover upon 
proving that a valid marriage existed and that his wife and the 
defendant-interloper engaged in sexual intercourse.' Although 
the right to maintain a criminal conversation action belonged 
exclusively to the husband at common law,' virtually all Ameri- 
can jurisdictions recognizing the action6 now permit the wife to 
1. " 'Criminal' because it was an ecclesiastical crime; 'conversation' in the sense of 
intercourse." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 875 n.75 (4th ed. 1971). For 
a more detailed history of criminal conversation, see Lippman, The Breakdown of Con- 
sortium, 30 COLUM. L REV. 651, 654-60 (1930). 
2. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *532. Blackstone states: 
Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it &.as a public 
crime, left by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts, yet, considered as 
a civil injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction 
to the husband for it by action of trespass ui et armis against the adulterer, 
wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary. 
Id. See also 2 T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS fj 167 (4th ed. 1932). 
3. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 875. 
"In its general and comprehensive sense, the term criminal conversation is synony- 
mous with adultery; but in its more limited and technical signification, in which it is here 
to be considered, it may be defined as adultery in the aspect of a tort." Turner v. 
Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 67, 206 S.W. 23, 23 (1918). 
4. Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 209, 170 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1969); Trainor v. 
Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 136, 259 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1969); Schneider v. Mistele, 39 
Wis. 2d 137, 141, 158 N.W.2d 383, 384 (1968). See Note, Piracy on the Matrimonial 
Seas-The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L.J. 594, 598 (1971). 
5. The primary reason that only the husband could bring a criminal conversation 
action is that the husband was considered to have a property right in the body of his 
wife. Since the wife was regarded as a chattel, a trespass action would lie against an 
interloper who had, in essence, used another's property. Lippman, supra note 1, at 655- 
56. The obstacles to a wife's recovery for her husband's adultery were first procedural 
because at common law she generally could not sue without joining her husband. Fur- 
thermore, whatever she might recover would become his property. See Bennett v. Ben- 
nett, 116 N.Y. 584, 593, 23 N.E. 17, 19-20 (1889). 
6. Although most states still recognize the cause of action for criminal conversation, 
currently sixteen states and the District of Columbia have legislatively abolished it. See 
ALA. CODE fj 6-5-331 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE fj  43.5 (West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. fj 13- 
20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. fj  52-572f (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
lo, fj 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. fj  16-923 (West Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. fj 
771.01 (West 1964); GA. CODE ANN. fj 105-1203 (Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. fj 34-4-4-1 
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maintain it, either by statute or by reason of a liberal interpreta- 
tion of the married women's property acts.' The Maryland Court 
of Appeals, however, took a different approach in Kline v. An- 
sell.8 Rather than expanding the cause of action for criminal 
conversation to allow the wife to maintain it against her hus- 
band's paramour, the court held the action unconstitutional as 
being violative of the state equal rights amendment and abol- 
ished it in its entirety? 
On August 17, 1962, Mr. Donald S. Ansell married Vivian 
Jean Klapperd in Biloxi, Missi~sippi.~~ The Ansell's marriage 
was marred by frequent arguments, financial difficulties, physi- 
cal violence, and Mr. Ansell's alcohol problem.ll On November 
10, 1977, Mrs. Ansell and their three children left the marital 
residence at the suggestion of her husband." In early 1978, 
Floyd R. Kline began having sexual relations with Mrs. Ansell 
even though she was still lawfully married to Mr. Ansell.lS Mr. 
Ansell filed a complaint against Mr. Nine in Maryland's Wash- 
ington County Circuit Court on September 1, 1978, seeking 
(Burns Supp. 1980); MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. g 600.2901 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
553.02 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 2A:23-1 (West 1952); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 80-a (McKinney 1976); OR. REV. STAT. 30.850 (1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-220 (1950); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 768.01 (West Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. 1-23-101 (1977). Prior to the 
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929 (Md. 1980), there 
were only two states that had judicially abolished criminal conversation. Bearbower v. 
Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 
(1976). 
7. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at  881-82. 
8. 414 A.2d 929 (Md. 1980). Maryland's Married Women's Act provides in pertinent 
part as follows: "Married women shall have power to . . . sue . . . for torts committed 
against them, as fully as if they were unmarried:" MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (Supp. 
1979). The Kline court explained that Maryland's Married Women's Act was not in- 
tended to create rights for married women in addition to those enjoyed by single women 
at common law. Since single women obviously could not maintain a criminal conversa- 
tion action at  common law, the Married Women's Act did not extend that right to mar- 
ried women. 414 A.2d a t  933 n.4. 
9. 414 A.2d at  933. 
10. Brief for Appellant at  2. Although the couple was married in Mississippi, they 
resided in New Jersey where three children were born to them. In 1971 they moved to 
Hagerstown, Maryland. Id. 
11. Id. at  3. After moving hia family to Hagerstown, Mr. Anaell returned to New 
Jersey where he began serving an 18 month prison sentence for an earlier criminal con- 
viction. During Mr. Ansell's absence, Mrs. Ansell was forced to rely primarily on public 
assistance for financial support. Id. at  2. 
12. Id. at  3. 
13. Id. Mr. Kline first met Mrs. Ansell in 1976. Later, after she had left her hus- 
band, Mr. a line helped Mrs. Ansell purchase a residence for her and her three children. 
At the time of the appeal Mr. Kline lived with Mrs. Ansell. Id. 
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damages for criminal conversation and assault." 
The jury found in favor of Mr. Ansell on the criminal con- 
versation count and the court awarded $40,000 compensatory 
damages and $4,250 punitive damages.'' Maryland's court of 
final jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, reversed? 
The court, in a unanimous opinion, began with an extensive 
history of the action for criminal conversation.17 Although the 
court set forth most of the rationales that have been relied upon 
by courts and legislatures to justify abolishing criminal conver- 
sation, it chose not to rest its decision on any of them.'. Instead 
the court reasoned that because the action for criminal conversa- 
tion in its common law form provided different benefits for and 
imposed different burdens upon men vis-a-vis women, it could 
not be reconciled with the Maryland equal rights amendment.'@ 
The court relied heavily on Rand v. Rand:O one of its own deci- 
sions dealing with the impact of Maryland's equal rights amend- 
ment on the father's common law obligation to support his mi- 
nor children. The Rand court held that the equal rights 
amendment mandated that the common law obligation of child 
support be shared equally by both parents.21 The Kline court 
determined that applying the Rand rationale produced a clear 
result: the elimination of the criminal conversation cause of ac- 
tion in Maryland.PP 
The rationale that state equal rights provisions mandate the 
abolition of criminal conversation is unsound in terms of legal 
analysis. The Kline decision represents a dangerous and unprec- 
edented application of a state equal rights amendment in the 
area of family law. Rather than abolishing criminal conversation 
altogether, the court should have modified the rules governing 
-- - 
14. 414 A.2d at 929-30. 
15. Brief for Appellant at  1. 
16. 414 Ad at 933. Following the trial court's directed verdict against Mr. Kline, he 
filed an appeal in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland as well as a petition for a 
writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The writ of certiorari was granted 
by the highest court before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 930. 
17. Id. at  930-31. 
18. Id. at 932. In response to these rationales, the court stated: "Were the interre- 
lated judicial and legislative history of this action in Maryland the only factor to be 
considered, we would deem it inappropriate to predicate its demise on the ground that it 
is unreasonable and anachronistic." Id. 
19. Id. at 933. 
20. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977). 
21. Id. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905. 
22. 414 A.2d at 933. 
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the action to ensure its just operation. 
Equal rights provisions do not mandate the elimination of 
the cause of action for criminal conversation. The wording of 
Maryland's equal rights amendment is clear and unambiguous: 
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or de- 
nied because of sex."'Vhe thrust of the state equal rights pro- 
vision "is to insure equality of rights under the law and to elimi- 
nate sex as a basis for distin~tion.''~~ The elimination of sex 
discrimination does not require the elimination of rights for 
both men and women. The more logical consequence of state 
equal rights amendments and state constitutions containing 
equal rights provisions is to extend to women those rights that 
were previously enjoyed only by men. 
The Kline court is the first court to rely on an equal rights 
amendment to abolish the criminal conversation cause of ac- 
tion? Surprisingly, neither the appellee's nor the appellant's 
brief even mentioned Maryland's equal rights amendment? 
Furthermore, the facts of the case do not readily present an 
equal rights issue because a woman was not seeking to bring the 
action. Since no precedent existed, and since neither brief dis- 
cussed Maryland's equal rights amendment, it is clear that the 
court generated its own equal rights argument. 
In search of some supporting authority for its decision, the 
court turned to its own analysis in Rand v. Rand.'' The Rand 
decision, however, does not support the Kline court's abolition 
of the criminal conversation cause of action. In Rand the court 
extended to women the father's common law obligation to sup- 
23. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 46. 
24. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d at 932 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 
101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974)). See also Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508,374 A.2d 900 (1977); 
Eckstein v. Eckstein, 38 Md. App. 506,379 A.2d 757 (1978); Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10, 
379 A.2d 419 (1977); Coleman v. State, 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977). 
25. Only Pennsylvania and Iowa had judicially abolished criminal conversation prior 
to Kline. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania justified abolishing criminal conversation 
on the ground that it "impose[s] upon a defendant such harsh results without affording 
any real opportunity to interject logically valid defenses . . . such as the role of the 
plaintWs spouse in the adulterous relationship or the quality of the plaintifF's marriage 
. . . ." Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 281, 365 A.2d 147, 151 (1976). The Supreme 
Court of Iowa relied upon essentially the same rationale to abolish criminial conversation 
in Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 1978). Although neither court relied 
on an equal rights provision to abolish criminal conversation, Pennsylvania could have 
because it has an equal rights amendment. 
26. See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee, Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929 
(Md. 1980). 
27. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977). 
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port his minor children, holding that "the parental obligation for 
child support . . . is one shared by both parents."28 The equal 
rights amendment in that instance expanded, not contracted, 
the common-law child support obligation. A correct application 
of Rand to the instant case merely would have extended to wo- 
men the right to maintain a criminal conversation action, not 
eliminated that right for both men and women. This misapplica- 
tion of both the Maryland equal rights amendment and the 
Rand rationale to the criminal conversation cause of action is a 
major flaw in the court's analysis. 
Numerous other examples exist where courts have applied 
state equal rights amendmentsa@ to laws governing family mat- 
t e r ~ . ~ ~  In such situations the courts have extended to men and 
women those family rights previously denied them, rather than 
eliminated essential rights to which they were entitled. An ex- 
amination of the impact that state equal rights provisions have 
had on child custody, child support, and consortium rights will 
demonstrate the anomaly the Kline decision represents. 
Rand is not the only case in which a court has extended to 
women the common law obligation of child support under the 
authority of a state equal rights amendment. Other courts also 
have held that child support should be shared equally by both 
parents.a1 This is not to say that both parents must give equal 
contributions, rather each parent has an equal obligation to pro- 
vide child support in accordance with his or her ability." No 
case authority exists for the situation where an equal rights 
amendment or an equivalent constitutional provision has elimi- 
nated the parental obligation of child support. 
Equal rights legislation has initiated a similar expansion of 
traditional family law rights in the child custody area. The pre- 
28. Id. at 516, 374 A2d at 905. 
29. Presently sixteen s t a h  have equal rights amendments or equal rights provisions 
in their constitutions. See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, 3; COLO. CONST. art. 2, 5 29; CONN. 
CONST. art. 1, 20; HAWAII CONST. art. 1 , s  4; ILL. CONST. art. 1, 5 18; MD. CONST. Decla- 
ration of Rights art. 46; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 1; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.H. CONST. 
pt. I, art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. 2, 5 18; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28, TEX. CONST. art. 1, 5 3a; 
UTAH CONST. art. 4,s  1; VA. CONST. art. 1 , s  11; WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1; WYO. CONST. 
art. 1, 5 3. 
30. See Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 158, 178-203 (1979). 
31. See Conway v. Dana, 456 P a  536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Lyle v. Lyle, 248 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 458, 375 A.2d 187 (1977); Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975); Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
32. See Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Cooper v. 
Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
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sumption that the mother is a more suitable custodian of the 
children than the father, and therefore should be given custody 
of the children on divorce, has been held to violate state equal 
rights provisions." The wife's right to custody of the children 
was not eliminated, but the husband was placed on equal status 
with her. 
The right to sue for loss of consortium represents another 
area of family law where state equal rights legislation has had an 
impact. In Hopkins v. B l a n ~ o , ~  the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that under the state's equal rights amendment, the 
wife possesses the same right that the husband does to sue for 
loss of consortium. Other courts have reached similar r e s ~ l & . ~ ~  
In the consortium context as in others, the application of equal 
rights legislation enabled women to bring an action that they 
previously could not maintain. 
The very application of equal rights provisions to criminal 
conversation is somewhat superficial in that married women in 
virtually all jurisdictions recognizing the action are now able to 
maintain it? American courts had already extended women the 
right to bring a criminal conversation action long before states 
began enacting equal rights legislation. The New York Court of 
Appeals' decision in Oppenheim v. Kridels7 recognized over fifty 
. years ago that there was no valid reason why women should be 
denied the right to bring a criminal conversation action: 
33. See, e.g., Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill. App. 3d 401,320 N.E.2d 581 (1974); Anagnos- 
topoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill. App. 3d 479, 317 N.E.2d 681 (1974); Spriggs v. Car- 
son, 470 Pa. 290,368 A.2d 635 (1977); McGowan v. McGowan, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 41,374 
A.2d 1306 (1977). See also Strand v. Strand, 41 Ill. App. 3d 651, 355 N.E.2d 47 (1976); 
Davis v. Davis, 41 Ill. App. 3d 942,354 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Christensen v. Christensen, 31 
Ill. App. 3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581 (1975); Pratt v. Pratt, 30 Ill. App. 3d 214, 330 N.E.2d 
244 (1975); Kauffman v. Kauffman, 30 Ill. App. 3d 159, 333 N.E.2d 695 (1975). 
34. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974). 
35. See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); Miller v. Whittlesey, 562 
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). 
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at  881-82. See, e.g., Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 
206 S.W. 23 (1918); N o h  v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283,77 N.E. 890 (1906); White v. Longo, 
190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973); Seaver v. Adams, 66 N.H. 142, 19 A. 776 (1890); 
Knighton v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947); Scates v. Nailling, 196 Tenn. 
508,268 S.W.2d 561 (1954); Cahoon v. Peltoa, 9 Utah 2d 224,342 P.2d 94 (1959); Freder- 
ick v. Morse, 88 Vt. 126,92 A. 16 (1914). Also, many of the jurisdictions that have abol- 
ished the criminal conversation cause of action had previously permitted women to 
maintain it. See, e.g., Parker v. Newman, 200 Ah. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917); Foot v. Card, 
58 Conn. 1, 18 A. 1027 (1889); Krom v. Krom, 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d 247 (1976); 
Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156,140 N.E. 227 (1923); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 
156 A.2d 537 (1959). 
37. 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923). 
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[Tlhere is no sound and legitimate reason for denying a cause 
of action for criminal conversation to the wife while giving it to 
the husband. Surely she is as much interested as the husband 
in maintaining the home and wholesome, clean, and affection- 
ate relatonships. Her feelings must be as sensitive as his to- 
ward the intruder, and it would be mere willful blindness on 
the part of the courts to ignore these facts. Both the courts of 
this state and the statutes have recognized this change in the 
status, rights, and privileges of a married woman.J8 
For many years most courts have allowed women to bring a 
criminal conversation action by simply expanding the common- 
law rule. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to apply equal 
rights legislation to the cause of action for criminal conversation. 
The Kline court's inconsistency in application of Mary- 
land's equal rights amendment to criminal conversation is fur- 
ther demonstrated by Geelhoed v. JensenYm one of its own deci- 
sions that had earlier recognized by way of dictum a married 
woman's right to maintain a criminal conversation action. After 
referring to the husband's right to bring a criminal conversation 
action, the Geelhoed court cited Restatement of Torts 5 690 
(1938), which allows a wife to bring a criminal conversation ac- 
tion.'O The Kline court distinguished the Geelhoed decision by 
contending that "[iln Geelhoed, . . . we did not consider the im- 
pact of the ERA."41 In addition to summarily distinguishing 
Geelhoed, the Kline court failed to mention Krom v. Krom," a 
Maryland lower court decision holding that "the tort of criminal 
conversation may be maintained by the wife of a marriage. Such, 
plainly, is the weight of auth~r i ty ."~~ The Kline court, however, 
refused to follow "the weight of authority"44 and effectively 
overruled Krom and the Geelhoed dicta. 
The application of Maryland's equal rights amendment to 
criminal conversation was also unwarranted in light of Mary- 
land's legislative action regarding the tort. As recently as 1977, 
38. Id. at 162, 140 N.E. at 229. 
39. 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976). 
40. Id. at 225, 352 A.2d at 821. 
41. 414 A.2d at 932. 
42. 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d 247 (1976). 
43. Id. at 637, 358 A.2d at 249. The Krom court justified its holding by relying on 
Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138, 48 A.2d 132 (1900), a Maryland Court of Appeals' decision 
that recognized a wife's right to maintain an action for alienation of affections. 
44. Krom v. Krom, 31 Md. App. at 637,358 A.2d at 249. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 
2d Husband and Wife 8 476 (1958); 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife 8 698 (1972). 
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both houses of Maryland's legislature rejected House Bill 170, 
which would have abolished criminal conversation? Contrary to 
this clear signal from the legislature that the cause of action be 
retained, the Kline court used the equal rights rationale to abol- 
ish criminal conversation. 
It is apparent, therefore, that the court's reliance on the 
equal rights amendment as a justification for abolishing criminal 
conversation is misplaced. A proper application of the Maryland 
equal rights amendment to criminal conversation would have ex- 
tended to women the right to maintain the action. The Kline 
court's use of the equal rights amendment to eliminate a family 
law right is a clear break from other case authority where equal 
rights provisions have been applied to family law. Also, the very 
application of Maryland's equal rights amendment to criminal 
conversation was unnecessary because married women already 
enjoyed the right to maintain the action in Maryland by reason 
of Krom and the Geelhoed dicta. Furthermore, Maryland's legis- 
lature clearly indicated its public policy choice to retain an ac- 
tion for criminal conversation. Thus, the Kline court's use of the 
Maryland equal rights amendment to abolish criminal conversa- 
tion suggests that an equal rights provision can be used by the 
courts as a sword to eliminate essential family law rights. 
Desite the unusual and questionable approach taken by the 
Maryland Court of Appeals in abolishing criminal conversation, 
the cause of action itself hae nevertheless been in disrepute for 
over half a century. At common law a plaintiff needed to prove 
only two facts to recover: (1) a valid marriage existed with his or 
her spouse, and (2) an act of sexual intercourse occurred be- 
tween his or her spouse and the defendant. This "strict liability" 
tort first came under attack in the United States with the Anti- 
Heart Balm legislation of the 1930P Many rationales have been 
offered to justify its demise: 
The action for criminal conversation is notorious for affording 
a fertile field for blackmail and extortion because it involves an 
accusation of sexual misbehavior. Criminal conversation ac- 
tions may frequently be brought, not for the purpose of pre- 
serving the marital relationship, but rather for purely merce- 
45. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d at 932. 
46. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balmn, 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935); 
Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63 (1936); Kingsley, The "Anti- 
Heart Balm" Statute, The Work of the 1939 California Legislature, 13 So. CAL. L. REV. 
37 (1939). 
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nary or vindictive motives. An award of damages does not 
constitute an effective deterrent to the act of adultery, and it 
does not effectively help to preserve or restore a marital rela- 
tionship in which adultery has already occurred. Indeed, a con- 
tested trial may destroy a chance to restore a meaningful rela- 
tionship. In addition, this action, which eliminates all defenses 
except the husband's consent and which imposes liability with- 
out any regard to the quality of the marital relationship, is in- 
compatible with today's sense of fairness. Most important, to- 
day's sense of the increasing personal and sexual freedom of 
women is incompatible with the rationale underlying this 
action.'? 
Although some of the attacks that have been made against 
the tort of criminal conversation are valid, many of them are 
unpersuasive. The argument that criminal conversation is not an 
effective deterrent to the act of adultery confuses tort law with 
criminal law. An underlying rationale of all tort liability "is the 
concern with compensation for harm done."48 If a harm has oc- 
curred to a recognized interest, in this case the interest in one's 
marriage, then tort law should apply to compensate for the harm 
suffered. Possible deterrence is only secondary. Although tort 
law may deter wrongful conduct, the main responsibility for de- 
terring wrongful conduct rests in the body of criminal law.'@ 
Since the primary function of tort law is to compensate for 
harm suffered, the inability of the defendant to assert as a de- 
fense the fact that the plaintiff's spouse consented to the adul- 
terous relation is also justified. Mrs. Ansell's consent to sexual 
relations with Mr. Kline does not alleviate the harm possibly 
suffered by Mr. Ansell, nor should it negate the compensation to 
which Mr. Ansell may be entitled." 
The argument that today's increasing personal and sexual 
freedom justifies abolishing criminal conversation is also unper- 
suasive. Tort liability is imposed upon a person who has harmed 
another by engaging in "conduct which is socially unreason- 
able."" Most married people still consider it socially unreason- 
able for a third person to have sexual relations with his or her 
47. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d at 931. 
48. P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERULS ON TORTS 2 (2d ed. 1977). 
49. Id. at 1-2. 
50. See generally Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). 
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 6. See Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 285, 365 
A.2d 147, 154 (1976) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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However, not all of the arguments favoring the abolition of 
criminal conversation are unpersuasive. Some valid criticisms of 
common-law criminal conversation actions are that the defend- 
ant is not permitted to assert logically valid defensesss and that 
the action may be brought for purely mercenary or vindictive 
motives. Of these criticisms, the classical attack on criminal con- 
versation is its susceptibility to abuse. I t  is widely recognized 
that a criminal conversation action may be brought for purely 
mercenary or vindictive motives. Many actions are susceptible to 
abuse, yet that does not necessarily justify abolishing them? 
One helpful modification that might alleviate abuse of the action 
would be to permit the factfinder to consider whether the action 
is a sham and, in such instances, to reduce damages accordingly. 
If the case were being tried to a jury, the court could instruct 
the jury that the plaintiffs motive in bringing the cause of ac- 
tion is a factor to consider in determining the damages award. 
This would discourage opportunists from bringing criminal con- 
versation actions and thereby would lessen the potential for 
abuse. Had the jury in the Kline case been able to consider Mr. 
Ansell's motive in bringing the cause of action, it is questionable 
whether $40,000 in compensatory damages would have been 
awarded. 
Another persuasive attack on criminal conversation is that 
the only defense available to the defendant is the plaintiffs con- 
sent. The inability of the defendant to assert logically valid de- 
52. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. at  285, 365 A.2d at 154. 
53. The only valid defense to criminal conversation was the husband's consent to 
the adulterous relation. See, e.g., Kohlhoss v. Mobley, 102 Md. 199, 62 A. 236 (1905). 
The Kline court stated: 
The fact that the wife consented, that she was the aggressor, that she repre- 
sented herself as single, that she was mistreated or neglected by her husband, 
that she and her husband were separated through no fault of her own, or that 
her huaband was impotent, were not valid defenses. 
414 A.2d at  930. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 612-14 
(1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 875; RESTA~MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 687 (1977). 
54. See Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1942). 
First, the very purpose of courts is to separate the just from the unjust causes; 
secondly, if the courts are to be closed against actions for . . . alienation of 
affections on the ground that some suits may be brought in bad faith, the same 
reason would close the door against litigants in all kinds of suits, for in every 
kind of litigation some suits are brought in bad faith; the very purpose of 
courts is to defeat unjust prosecutions and to secure the rights of parties in 
just prosecutions. 
Id. at  729. 
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fenses may produce harsh results. This rule could be modified so 
that the defendant would not be liable unless he knew or should 
have known that his paramour was married. Such a modification 
would permit the defendant to assert his ignorance of any mari- 
tal relationship as a defense. Since the basis of criminal conver- 
sation is intermeddling with the marital relationship, a person 
should not be liable for the harm he causes unless he knows or 
by reasonable inquiry should have known that he is interfering 
with a marriage."" 
Another prudent modification would be to permit the 
factfinder to consider the quality of the marital relationship in 
determining the amount of recoverable damages." The key cri- 
terion in such a determination should be whether the husband 
and wife are still living together in a marital relationship. The 
facts in the Kline case illustrate the need for this change. Since 
Mr. Ansell suggested that Mrs. Ansell leave the marital resi- 
dence," and since the Ansells were separated when Mrs. Ansell 
began having intercourse with Mr. Kline:8 it is highly question- 
able whether Mr. Ansell suffered any compensable harm. The 
trial court's $44,250 award probably would have been substan- 
tially less if the quality of the marital relationship had been con- 
sidered as a factor in determining the actual harm suffered by 
Mr. Ansell. 
The primary interest the tort of criminal conversation seeks 
to protect is a highly valued interest in most marriages: the ex- 
clusive right to have sexual intercourse with one's spouse." The 
cause of action for criminal conversation seeks to preserve one of 
the most delicate human relationships-that of husband and 
55. Note, The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska, 58 NEB. L. REV. 595, 
607-08 (1979). 
56. Arguably, the mere occurrence of infidelity in a marriage indicates deterioration 
in the quality of that marital relationship. There are, however, instances where the inter- 
loper intrudes into a normally secure marriage by way of seduction and thereby destroys 
a quality marital relationship. In any event, allowing the quality of the marriage to be a 
factor would just allow the jury to make a case-by-case judgment of what harm, if any, 
has been done. 
57. Brief for Appellant at 3. 
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 66 N.W.2d 420 (1954); Hargraves v. 
Ballou, 47 R.I. 186, 131 A. 643 (1926); McMillian v. Felsenthal, 482 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1972). 
Although the interest sought to be protected is quite narrow, the real basis of recovery is 
"the defilement of the marriage bed, the blow to the family honor, and the suspicion cast 
upon the legitimacy of the offspring." W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 875. 
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wife.60 Although the Ansell marriage had deteriorated to the 
point that perhaps no relationship remained, many other viable 
marital relationships exist that deserve protection. Rather than 
abolishing the cause of action for criminal conversation by using 
a questionable equal rights amendment rationale, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals should have considered the modifications of 
criminal conversation presented here. By retaining the action for 
criminal conversation in a modified form, a civil remedy would 
still be available to those who actually had been harmed by an 
unwarranted interference with their marriage while avoiding 
many of the injustices the action may produce? 
McKay Marsden 
60. See 1 F. HARPER & F. J-S, supra note 53 at 606. 
61. Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 479, 268 N.W.2d 582, 588 (1978) (McCown, J., 
dissenting). 
